

12 **IN RE OPTICAL DISK DRIVE**
13 **ANTITRUST LITIGATION**

CASE NO. 3:10-md-2143 RS

ORDER GRANTING INDIRECT PURCHASERS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

This Document Relates to:

16 || ALL ACTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

20 In 2009, the Department of Justice disclosed the existence of an ongoing criminal
21 investigation of possible antitrust violations within the optical disc drive (“ODD”) industry. That
22 investigation ultimately resulted in guilty pleas by Hitachi-LG Data Storage, Inc. and some of its
23 employees. Substantial fines were imposed and the individuals were sentenced to prison terms.
24 This Multi-District Litigation consolidates the many civil actions that were filed against ODD
25 manufacturers in the wake of the DOJ investigation.

26 From the outset of this matter, defendants have conceded, that as the guilty pleas reflect,
27 there were at least some instances of illegal anticompetitive conduct in connection with the sale of
28 ODDs. Specifically, defendants do not deny there were multiple incidents involving “bid rigging”

1 during procurements of ODDs by Dell, HP, and Microsoft. The controversy therefore has centered
2 on whether the wrongdoing was limited to those events and defendants, or whether, as plaintiffs
3 contend, the bid rigging was merely one part of a vast industry-wide price-fixing conspiracy, also
4 involving inter-competitor agreements, and exchanges of price, output, and other types of
5 confidential information.

6 Previously, two groups of plaintiffs, so-called “direct purchasers” (“DPPs”) and “indirect
7 purchasers,” (“IPPs”) who are separately represented and proceeding under separate complaints,
8 sought class certification. The crux of the disputes in the two certification motions was whether
9 plaintiffs’ experts had presented a viable methodology for establishing class-wide antitrust injury
10 and damages. Because neither group of plaintiffs had made a persuasive showing that the expert
11 analyses they proffered sufficiently address the relevant question, the motions were both denied.
12 Subsequent to that ruling and to the Ninth Circuit denying leave to appeal, the DPPs entered into
13 settlement agreements disposing of their remaining claims.

14 The IPPs also reached settlement agreements with certain defendants—court approval of
15 those settlements is pending. As to their remaining claims, however, the IPPs have renewed their
16 request for class certification. The IPPs support their renewed motion with further analysis from Dr.
17 Kenneth Flamm, their economic expert, consisting of both modified and additional approaches to
18 the calculations he performed, and consideration of more data. Defendants insist the additional
19 material proffered is not substantively different from that previously found to be inadequate as a
20 means for establishing class-wide antitrust injury and damages. Defendants also continue to argue
21 that certain alleged errors in Dr. Flamm’s methodology render his conclusions unreliable.

22 As plaintiffs state, “there is a meaningful line drawn at class certification between methods
23 and merits.” That line, dividing what is an appropriate inquiry into the soundness of plaintiffs’
24 proffered statistical models on the one hand, and an improper adjudication of merits issues on the
25 other hand, remains challenging to draw. Here, some of the issues defendants have raised may
26 ultimately be persuasive to a trier of fact that plaintiffs cannot show antitrust injury or establish
27 damages across the class. The methodologies and theories plaintiffs proffer, however, will stand or
28 fall on a class-wide basis and are not so lacking in substance as to permit rejection at the

1 certification stage. Accordingly, with consideration of the choice of law issue discussed below, the
2 motion for certification will be granted, as to 23 states and the District of Columbia, under
3 California law.¹

5 II. BACKGROUND

6 The factual background and long procedural history of this action have been set out in prior
7 orders and will not be recounted in full detail here. Briefly, an optical disc² is a medium for storing
8 data. Familiar forms include CDs (compact discs) typically containing music or computer software,
9 and DVDs (digital video disc or, officially, Digital Versatile Disc), often containing movies or other
10 video content, and also used for computer software. Depending on the stage of technological
11 development, optical discs were “read-only” or “recordable” or “rewritable.” In a broad sense, the
12 technology evolved generationally from CDs to DVDs to Blu-Ray Discs, each with a progression
13 from read-only, to recordable, and then to rewritable.

14 Optical disc drives—ODDs—are devices that allow data to be read from and, where
15 applicable, written to, optical discs. ODDs are typically “backwards-compatible,” – that is, an ODD
16 that is designed to read (and perhaps write to) a more recently-developed format of optical disc
17 usually will also be able to process older formats as well. ODDs have applications in a variety of
18 consumer electronic devices, including desktop and laptop computers, game consoles, and
19 camcorders. In these applications, the ODD is typically a built-in component of the device. ODDs
20 are also available as stand-alone units, in a number of forms. Where ODDs are incorporated into
21 other products such as computers, they typically represent a relatively small percentage of the cost

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24 ¹ The various motions to file material under seal in connection with the renewed motion for class
certification reflect appropriate efforts to limit the material withheld from the public record, and are
25 therefore granted, without prejudice to any subsequent motion to unseal, should good cause exist.
The parties are requested to submit jointly a single proposed order specifying the materials that will
26 remain sealed and identifying by docket number all of the sealing motions to which it pertains.

27 ² Although the caption of this action is “In re Optical Disk Drive Litigation,” the preferred spelling
28 appears to be “disc,” for optical media, as opposed to “disk,” for magnetic media.

1 of the product as a whole. Plaintiffs have argued, however, that an ODD can be one of the more
2 significant individual cost components in a computer, even if only a fraction of the total.

3 During the putative class period, the prices of ODDs were generally marked by steep
4 declines. While each generational advance in the technology was often introduced at a higher price,
5 the overall trend was downward, and dramatically so, as has generally been the case in the high
6 technology arena. Plaintiffs' basic theory in this action is that defendants were highly motivated to
7 attempt to slow, or at least stabilize, the inevitable decline in prices. In short, plaintiffs are not
8 arguing that the alleged conspiracy drove prices upward, merely that it kept prices from falling as
9 rapidly and/or as far as they otherwise would have.

10 At the center of this action are multiple instances of alleged "bid rigging" involving
11 procurements of ODDs by Dell, HP, and Microsoft. In connection with the now-closed DOJ
12 investigation into that conduct, defendant Hitachi-LG Data Storage, Inc. pleaded guilty to criminal
13 antitrust violations and paid a \$21.1 million criminal fine. As alluded to above, plaintiffs contend
14 that lengthy and voluminous discovery has revealed evidence the bid rigging was merely one part of
15 a vast industry-wide price-fixing conspiracy, involving a broad range of improper anti-competitive
16 behavior.

17 Although much of the evidence to which plaintiffs point involves the bidding events, they
18 contend continuous illegal information exchanges occurred among all defendants relating to
19 customer accounts other than HP and Dell. Plaintiffs point to certain "alliances" among defendants
20 that allegedly allocated customers and markets. They contend "supply arrangements" existed
21 among certain defendants that nominally were competitors in the market. Plaintiffs aver that
22 defendants reached oral agreements at various meetings in Asia and in the United States at
23 numerous points in time. While plaintiffs argue that cumulatively the evidence is indicative of a
24 "pervasive" industry-wide conspiracy, at least at this juncture they have not proffered evidence or
25 allegations of any instances in which the defendants' executive decision-makers entered into express
26 agreements to fix prices across the board on an ongoing basis.

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1 III. LEGAL STANDARD

2 Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
3 represents much more than a mere pleading standard. To obtain class certification, plaintiffs bear the
4 burden of showing that they have met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one
5 subsection of Rule 23(b). *Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc.*, 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, amended by
6 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). “A party seeking class certification must affirmatively
7 demonstrate . . . compliance with the Rule.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551
8 (2011). Rule 23(a) provides that a district court may certify a class only if: “(1) the class is so
9 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
10 common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
11 or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
12 interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). That is, the class must satisfy the requirements of
13 numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation to maintain a class action.
14 *Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012).

15 If all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a court must also find that plaintiffs
16 “satisfy through evidentiary proof” at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). *Comcast*
17 *Corp. v. Behrend*, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (2013). Relevant here is Rule 23(b)(3), which permits certification
18 if a court finds that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
19 questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
20 methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

21 “[A] court’s class-certification analysis must be ‘rigorous’ and may ‘entail some overlap
22 with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.’ ” *Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust*
23 *Funds*, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013) (quoting *Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. at 2551); *see also Mazza*, 666 F.3d at
24 588 (“Before certifying a class, the trial court must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine
25 whether the party seeking certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23.”) (quoting *Zinser*, 253
26 F.3d at 1186)). This “rigorous” analysis applies to both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b). *See Comcast*,
27 133 S.Ct. at 1432 (discussing how Congress included “addition[al] . . . procedural safeguards for
28 (b)(3) class members beyond those provided for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members (e.g., an opportunity

1 to opt out)" and how a court has a "duty to take a 'close look' at whether common questions
2 predominate over individual ones.").

3 Nevertheless, "Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at
4 the certification stage." *Amgen*, 133 S.Ct. at 1194–95. "Merits questions may be considered to the
5 extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23
6 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied." *Id.* at 1195. If a court concludes that the moving
7 party has met its burden of proof, then the court has broad discretion to certify the class. *Zinser*, 253
8 F.3d at 1186.

9

10 IV. DISCUSSION

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12 A. Class definition

13 The IPPs' renewed motion proposes a slightly narrowed class definition:

14 All persons and entities who, as residents of [the United States or
15 State] and during the period April 2003 to December 2008, purchased
16 new for their own use and not for resale: (i) a computer with an
17 internal ODD; (ii) a stand-alone ODD designed for internal use in
18 computers; or (iii) an ODD designed to be attached externally to a
19 computer. ODD refers to a DVD-RW, DVD-ROM, or COMBO drive
manufactured by one or more Defendants or their coconspirators.
Excluded from the class are any purchases of Panasonic-branded
computers.

20 This narrower language removes CD and Blu-ray ODDs from the scope of products involved
21 in the litigation. Additionally, the products are limited to computers containing ODDs and stand-
22 alone ODDs only, removing videogame consoles such as the Xbox. Panasonic-branded computers
23 are also now excluded. Finally, although IPPs continue to claim the conspiracy did not end until
24 sometime in 2009, they limit the damages period to extend only through December 2008. The IPPs
25 contend, and defendants do not particularly dispute, that the effect of these changes is to remove
26 significant volumes of products to which defendants pointed in the prior motion as reflecting
27 heterogeneity sufficient to defeat class certification.

28

1 Plaintiffs have also proposed a “subclass,” consisting of purchasers of products from Dell
2 and HP, the two entities most directly affected by the alleged bid-rigging. IPPs assert that because
3 Flamm’s economic models now provide separate estimates for the alleged overcharge on Dell and
4 HP products, certifying a subclass will give the trier of fact the option to conclude the object and
5 impact of the conspiracy was limited to ODDs sold to and incorporated in Dell and HP computers.
6 Whether the IPPs advance the possibility of certifying a subclass as a hedge against outright denial
7 of their motion, or rather out of a genuine concern that such a subclass needs separate definition,
8 remains unclear. A fundamental premise of the IPPs’ motion is that prices in the ODD industry
9 during the class period were linked, and, moreover, that prices paid by Dell and HP effectively set a
10 “floor,” given their combined share of the market and purchasing power. At this juncture, at least,
11 the IPPs have not demonstrated that defining a subclass is warranted, and that aspect of the motion
12 will be denied, without prejudice. If, in the course of trial preparation or trial itself, it becomes
13 apparent that defining a subclass of Dell and HP would have salutary purposes, the issue may be
14 revisited.

15

16 B. Predominance

17 The IPPs seek class certification under subsection (3) of Rule 23(b), which requires them to
18 show (1) “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate” and (2) “a
19 class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
20 controversy.” As set out in the prior order, to obtain class certification, the IPPs must satisfy the
21 predominance requirement with respect to all the key elements of their claims: (1) whether there
22 was a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the antitrust laws; (2) the fact of plaintiffs’ antitrust
23 injury, or “impact” of defendants’ unlawful activity; and (3) the amount of damages sustained as a
24 result of the antitrust violations. *In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.*,
25 2006 WL 1530166, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2006); *In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.*, 209 F.R.D. at 257.

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27 The prior order explained why the existence or non-existence of the alleged conspiracy
28 presented an appropriate question for resolution on a class-wide basis, and the parties have not
revisited that issue in the present motion. While the parties briefly discuss the question of damages,

1 there is no basis to conclude that damages issues would be a basis for denying certification if
2 otherwise warranted. A plaintiff's damages “[c]alculations need not be exact, but . . . ‘must be
3 consistent with its liability case.’” *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend*, U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013)
4 (internal citation omitted). Although defendants have offered reasons they contend that Dr. Flamm’s
5 damages models are flawed, those arguments may appropriately be considered by the trier of fact,
6 and do not rise to a level that would require denial of certification. Accordingly, the critical issue is
7 antitrust injury or impact.

8

9 1. *Class-wide injury*

10 The prior order denying the motions for certification brought by both the DPPs and the IPPs
11 centered on the question of whether plaintiffs had presented a plausible methodology for
12 establishing class-wide injury. *See In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.*,
13 2006 WL 1530166, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“plaintiffs must establish the predominance of common
14 issues . . . [as to] the fact of plaintiff’s antitrust injury, or “impact” of defendants’ unlawful
15 activity.”³ That order explained the question arises under subsection (3) of Rule 23(b), which, as
16 noted above, places a burden on plaintiffs to show, among other things, that “questions of law or fact
17 common to the members of the class predominate.” Predominance requires “that the common
18 issues be both numerically and qualitatively substantial in relation to the issues peculiar to
19 individual class members.” *In re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prod. Antitrust Litig.*, 2006 WL 891362

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21 ³ Defendants’ booklet of slides submitted at the hearing as an aid to oral argument repeatedly
22 invokes “law of the case” when describing various findings set out in the prior order. “Under the
23 ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has
24 already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case The doctrine is
25 not a limitation on a tribunal’s power, but rather a guide to discretion A court may have
26 discretion to depart from the law of the case where: 1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; 2) an
27 intervening change in the law has occurred; 3) the evidence on remand is substantially different; 4) other
28 changed circumstances exist; or 5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result.” *United States v. Alexander*, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). While certain statements quoted in the booklet represent basic legal principles that remain valid, resort to “law of the case” is not necessary to make that so. Other statements offered as “law of the case” merely describe the record presented in the prior certification motion and the legal conclusions reached on *that* record. The issue now is what legal conclusions are supported by the record presented in *this* motion. Invocation of “law of the case” is therefore inapt in this context.

1 at *9. Generally speaking, the test for predominance is met “when there exists generalized evidence
2 which proves or disproves an [issue or element] on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such
3 proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.” *In re Vitamins*
4 *Antitrust Litig.*, 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

5 As in their prior motion for certification, the IPPs proffer evidence and expert opinion that
6 various conditions in the ODD industry were conducive to the formation of an antitrust conspiracy,
7 including barriers to entry, high concentration among sellers, substantial cross-ownership, including
8 joint ventures, and an allegedly commoditized product. The IPPs also argue that the DOJ
9 investigation and resulting penalties, an enforcement action in Taiwan, and rumors of penalties to be
10 issued by the European Union, all further support an inference of a conspiracy, with class-wide
11 impact. The real meat of plaintiffs’ motion, however, lies in Dr. Flamm’s presentation of
12 econometric analysis offered to show, in essence, that prices in the ODD market during the class
13 period were linked, such that all direct purchasers would likely have been impacted by a
14 conspiratorial overcharge.⁴

15 In addressing the expert testimony offered to show class-wide injury to direct purchasers, the
16 prior order first focused on the analysis provided by Dr. Gary French, who had been retained by the
17 DPPs. In addition to pointing to certain characteristics of the industry, Dr. French offered (1) an
18 empirical correlation analysis and (2) a regression analysis which he contended could serve as
19 reliable, economically sound, methodologies to demonstrate that all, or nearly all, members of the
20 class suffered damage as a result of defendants’ alleged anti-competitive conduct. In finding the
21 correlation analysis lacking, the prior order pointed to Dr. French’s admission that “[w]ith or
22 without a conspiracy I would expect to see high correlation of prices across customers in this
23 industry.” The order further concluded that Dr. French’s regression analysis, which calculated a
24 single overcharge percentage for all purchasers across all models of ODDs and throughout the entire
25 class period, effectively assumed the proposition it was intended to prove—i.e. class-wide impact.

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28 ⁴ Showing impact to direct purchasers is, of course, only the first step in the IPPs’ burden. As
discussed below, they must also show “pass-through” of the overcharges to the IPP class.

1 In the IPPs' renewed motion, Dr. Flamm stops short of explicitly endorsing the prior order's
2 rejection of Dr. French's model, but he makes clear his view that his own analysis previously
3 included elements that were lacking in Dr. French's approach, and which he contends address the
4 issues raised by the prior order, at least in part. Indeed, the prior order expressly noted that Dr.
5 Flamm's analysis was "more complex" than that of Dr. French. Significantly, the prior order noted,
6 Dr. Flamm included a "cointegration" analysis designed to filter out "spurious" correlations that
7 would arise even in the absence of a conspiracy, and his model allowed for more than one estimated
8 overcharge coefficient. Nevertheless, the prior order concluded the IPPs had failed to make a
9 persuasive showing that Dr. Flamm's somewhat more complex analysis could serve to establish
10 class-wide impact, rather than assuming it.

11 While Dr. Flamm does not endorse that view of his prior analysis, for the present motion he
12 has done additional work designed to eliminate any doubt that his methodologies are reliably
13 designed to measure class-wide impact (if any), rather than to assume it. First, Dr. Flamm now
14 offers a "more extensive" cointegration analysis, which he contends controls for declining ODD
15 prices in the market. The "refined" analysis now includes data from a greater number of
16 defendants—Dr. Flamm contends it incorporates *all* the "sufficiently useable data" produced in
17 discovery. Dr. Flamm asserts the analysis empirically tests for (and supports) the existence of
18 market-wide impact by studying the prices for ODDs sold to different customer segments.

19 As Dr. Flamm explains it, a "cointegration test is a test for structural economic cohesion
20 among variables with time trends." Dr. Flamm has tested for economic cohesion between ODD
21 products, prices, producers, and customers. In his view, if there is cointegration, there is a strong
22 likelihood of market-wide impact from the conspiracy. Acknowledging that a correlation analysis
23 does not necessarily imply causation, he opines that cointegration does. From his cointegration
24 analysis Dr. Flamm concludes that the relationships among ODD prices in the class period "are
25 NOT a spurious artifact of these prices simply declining over time." (Emphasis in original.) Rather,
26 in Dr. Flamm's opinion, the co-integration revealed by his analysis supports a conclusion that "the
27 economic forces of substitution in supply and demand link prices for different drives to different
28 customers together in the market."

1 Second, Dr. Flamm has performed a new “Granger causality” analysis.⁵ That analysis asks
 2 the question, “does the history of a series x assist in forecasting a series y when one also knows the
 3 history of y?” *See In re Amaranth*, 269 F.R.D. at 384. Here, Dr. Flamm’s analysis concludes that
 4 after controlling for the entire past history of prices and costs for any single type of drive, the past
 5 history of drive prices for Dell or HP has statistically significant value in predicting the prices for
 6 other customers. Thus, Dr. Flamm opines, changes in ODD prices in sales to HP and Dell caused
 7 price movements among drives sold to other ODD purchasers.

8 Third, Dr. Flamm has modified his overcharge regression model in four respects:

9 (a) The overcharge model now is expressly delineated to estimate separate overcharge
 10 coefficients first for Dell and HP on the one hand, and then for “other” customers. As a result, Dr.
 11 Flamm contends, the overcharge model now expressly is capable of testing whether the cartel
 12 impacted only its two largest customers (Dell and HP) or also the other direct purchasers.

13 (b) The overcharge regression model is also capable of measuring the overcharge on
 14 a monthly basis, by each different drive in the class (DVD-RW, DVD-ROM, and COMBO) for each
 15 of these customer groups.

16 (c) The model now integrates all “useable” sales and cost data produced – from
 17 86 percent of the market (all but two defendants).

18 (d) IPPs provide further detail on the multivariable regression analysis, which they contend
 19 shows that all factors other than conspiracy are being adequately controlled for in the overcharge
 20 model.

21 Finally, the IPPs present additional graphic evidence and argument to support their claim that
 22 prices paid by Dell and HP effectively served as a “floor,” and that any artificial maintenance of the
 23 level of that floor would necessarily impact prices paid by other customers. The IPPs take issue
 24 with a characterization in the prior order that the prices charged to other customers did not “cluster
 25 within an especially narrow range above the supposed ‘floor’ of the prices paid by Dell and HP.”

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 27 ⁵ “Granger causality” analysis refers to the Engle–Granger regression form created by Robert F.
 28 Engle and Clive W.J. Granger—who shared the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2003 on the basis of
 their development of this methodology. *See In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig.*, 269
 F.R.D. 366, 384 n. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

1 The relevant question, the IPPs insist, is not the existence or non-existence of any such clustering,
2 but whether the economic evidence supports linkage between the prices. The IPPs point out that,
3 with one exception, the prices paid by other customers were maintained at a generally consistent
4 level above those paid by Dell and HP.⁶

5 Defendants argue that none of these changes or additions to Dr. Flamm’s analysis warrants a
6 different conclusion from that reached in the prior order. Defendants fully endorse the order’s
7 finding that Dr. Flamm was effectively *assuming* class-wide impact, and argue he is still doing so.
8 As previously explained, the standard under which expert opinion like that offered by Dr. Flamm is
9 to be evaluated at class certification has been evolving. The *DRAM* decision suggested that courts
10 “must avoid engaging in a battle of expert testimony.” 2006 WL 1530166, at *9. Particularly in
11 light of the “rigorous analysis” required under *Dukes* and *Comcast*, however, the caution offered in
12 *GPU* is apt. “[C]ertification [should not be] automatic every time counsel dazzle the courtroom
13 with graphs and tables.” 253 F.R.D. at 491. If the presumption were otherwise, “nearly all antitrust
14 plaintiffs could survive certification without fully complying with Rule 23.” *Id.* at 492; *see also, In*
15 *re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.*, 289 F.R.D. 555, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“conducting a
16 thorough review of Plaintiffs’ theory and methodology is consistent with the requirement that the
17 Court conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’” to ensure that the predominance requirement is met”); *In re*
18 *Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.*, 725 F.3d 244, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“It is now clear . . .
19 that Rule 23 not only authorizes a hard look at the soundness of statistical models that purport to
20 show predominance—the rule commands it.”). Put another way, the inquiry must be to determine if
21 the proffered expert testimony has the requisite integrity to demonstrate class-wide impact.

22 GPU notes that “antitrust plaintiffs have in recent years trended toward presenting an
23 econometric formula or other statistical analysis to show class-wide impact” and that such analysis
24 has often been accepted at the certification stage. 253 F.R.D. at 491. GPU concluded that “such

26 ⁶ The exception involves the prices of “combo drives” in 2008. The IPPs attempt to explain that
27 exception away by asserting that Dell and HP were simply overcharged more for these particular
28 drives than were other customers. It is unclear whether this explanation can be supported by other
objective evidence. There is a significant concern that instead the IPPs are being unduly dismissive
of data that does not fit their theory. Ultimately, however, that will be for the trier of fact to
evaluate further.

1 methods, where plausibly reliable, should be allowed as a means of common proof. To rule
2 otherwise would allow antitrust violators a free pass in many industries.” *Id.* Accordingly, it is
3 clear that statistical and economic methodologies of the sort advanced here *may* be employed to
4 establish class-wide impact. While defendants have strenuously quarreled with Dr. Flamm’s
5 implementation of econometric models, they do *not* challenge the propriety of employing such
6 models in the first instance.

7 Defendants and their expert advance a litany of supposed defects in Dr. Flamm’s analysis.
8 At heart, though, the biggest dispute between the parties as to the appropriate mode of analysis lies
9 in the degree to which the available data should be “aggregated” or “disaggregated.” As defendants
10 point out, where averages and conclusions are drawn from overly-broad data sets, it may conceal a
11 reality that many members of the data set do not share the characteristics reflected in the averages.
12 In crude form, for example, if it were the empirical case that 1 million combo drives were sold with
13 a \$10 overcharge each, and 1 million DVD-ROM drives were sold with *no* overcharge, aggregating
14 the data would show that 2 million drives were sold with an average overcharge of \$5, when in fact
15 fully half of the drives were not impacted by conspiracy at all.

16 The IPPs and Dr. Flamm do not suggest that misleading results could never emerge from
17 over-aggregation. They point out, however, that *reducing* sample size too far undermines the
18 statistical reliability of any results, possibly masking effects that truly exist by impeding their
19 detection at conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, they contend, the calculations
20 offered by defendants to suggest the impact of any conspiracy was not-class wide are unreliable, or,
21 at the most, represent a challenge to the merits of Dr. Flamm’s calculations, not appropriately
22 resolved at the class certification stage.

23 Other quarrels defendants have with Dr. Flamm’s analysis involve his selection of particular
24 data to utilize, the variables he has elected to include in his regressions, and similar details relating
25 to the implementation of his econometric models. While some or all of these points certainly could
26 be considered by a fact-finder evaluating the persuasiveness of Dr. Flamm’s conclusions, defendants
27 have not shown a basis for wholly rejecting those conclusions at this stage in the proceedings as
28 methodologically unsound. Nor does it appear that it would be legitimate to characterize Dr.

1 Flamm's expanded analysis as one which assumes class-wide impact. Rather, he has presented
2 theories that explain why, in his view, class-wide impact would have existed, and he has offered
3 means for testing the data to demonstrate that it did, and to calculate what he believes the
4 overcharges were. Defendants will be free to show why they think Dr. Flamm is wrong, but for
5 purposes of satisfying the requisites of Rule 23, the IPPs have now made an adequate showing of a
6 methodology for proving antitrust injury to all or nearly all direct purchasers, on a class-wide basis.
7

8 *2. Pass-through*

9 As noted above, IPPs, unlike DPPs, have a two-fold burden in securing class certification in
10 matters such as this. Not only must they show that all or nearly all of the original *direct* purchasers
11 of ODDs bought at inflated prices, they must also show those overcharges were passed through all
12 stages of the distribution chain. *See In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litigation*, 253
13 F.R.D. 478, 499 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“GPU”) (“[I]ndirect-purchaser plaintiffs must demonstrate that
14 defendants overcharged their direct purchasers . . . and that those direct purchasers passed on the
15 overcharges to plaintiffs. In so doing, they must find a way to account for the decision-making of a
16 variety of resellers and manufacturers.”).

17 Because the prior order concluded the IPPs had not shown a viable method for establishing
18 impact to all or nearly all of the underlying direct purchasers, it made no conclusive determinations
19 as to the adequacy of their showing on pass-through. The order, however, expressed skepticism as to
20 whether the issue could ever be resolved on a class-wide basis. Of concern was whether, as in *GPU*,
21 “the only way to fully assess pass-through in this action would be to conduct a wholesaler-by-
22 wholesaler and re-seller-by-re-seller investigation, which would essentially result in ‘thousands of
23 mini-trials, rendering this case unmanageable and unsuitable for class action treatment.’” 253 F.R.D.
24 at 505 (quoting *McCarter v. Abbott Labs., Inc.*, 1993 WL 13011463, at *5 (Ala.Cir.Ct. 1993)). That
25 concern was driven, in large part, by an assumption that the existence and amount of any pass-
26 through might vary greatly, depending on the particular sales channels and other circumstances
27 surrounding how any given ODDs were sold.

28

1 The prior order also specifically posited that it might be challenging to establish pass-
2 through given the existence of price points—i.e., a common practice in the industry of selling
3 products costing in the hundreds of dollars at prices just under the next \$100 mark. As an example,
4 the prior order suggested it would be implausible for a retailer to raise the price of a computer that
5 otherwise would sell for \$999 to \$1003, if the overcharge paid by the direct purchaser on the ODD
6 installed in a computer was only four dollars.

7 The IPPs' renewed motion for class certification makes the important point that the price-
8 fixing in this case is alleged to have consisted of efforts to slow the *decline* in prices that otherwise
9 naturally was occurring, and there is no allegation prices of ODDs were ever driven *up*, in absolute
10 terms. Moreover, the naturally occurring cost declines were not limited to ODDs, but took place in
11 most or nearly all of the components typically making up computer systems. As such, the
12 hypothetical that presumed a retailer would be unlikely to increase a price from \$999 to \$1003 may
13 not be the most effective way of evaluating what might happen in the “but-for” world without the
14 alleged conspiracy. Nevertheless, to the extent “price points” are a significant factor in how
15 computers containing ODDs are sold,⁷ they still potentially present issues for which the IPPs will
16 ultimately have to account.

17 For example, if a retailer wants to sell a computer at the \$999 price point, and ordinarily
18 would take a profit of \$50 on the sale, it must buy from the manufacturer at \$949. Assume that in
19 the but-for world, the manufacturer's cost to build that computer would have been \$899, given how
20 inexpensive ODDs had become and how far all of the other relevant costs had declined at that
21 particular point in time. The manufacturer could have sold at \$949, and also have taken a \$50 profit.
22 With a \$5 overcharge on the ODD, however, the manufacturer's cost is \$904. It is not intuitively
23 obvious that the overcharge would, in all or nearly all cases, get passed on to the end consumer—the
24 IPP. At least in theory, the manufacturer could still sell for \$949, and just take a smaller profit. Or,
25 the manufacturer could sell at \$954, and the retailer could settle for a \$45 profit on the \$999 sale to
26 the IPP. In either circumstance, or in any scenario where the manufacturer and retailer each

27 ⁷ The IPPs present evidence that price points may not be as ubiquitous as implied by the prior order.
28 Unless they are extremely rare, however, which seems unlikely, IPPs presumably will still have to
account for their potential effects on pass-through.

1 sacrificed *some* of their profit for a total of \$5, none of the overcharge would be passed through to
2 the IPP.

3 At this juncture, however, the IPPs have presented a sufficient theory and methodology to
4 permit them to attempt to prove pass-through on a class-wide basis. In broad terms, plaintiffs have
5 proffered evidence that in competitive markets, economic theory (supported by empirical studies)
6 consistently predicts that pass-through rates will be at or near 100%. The IPPs assert this is because
7 in a cost-declining market, competition will generally drive prices down to costs. The IPPs offer the
8 explanation that if a firm tries to keep a cost reduction for itself – to increase margins over costs –
9 other firms which also receive similar cost reductions will lower their prices (passing on the cost
10 reductions) to siphon market share from the firm(s) which do not pass-on costs reductions. As the
11 IPPs put it, “[t]his is the nature of competition,” and in competitive markets, profit-maximizing
12 behavior virtually always passes on cost-savings in full into lower prices.

13 There is no significant dispute that the relevant markets here are generally highly
14 competitive. The IPPs offer that they have now measured pass-through rates for over 273 million
15 ODD products. While results show the pass-through rates are not uniform, they are uniformly high
16 and positive – which IPPs contend is sufficient to show that overcharges were consistently passed
17 through to consumers. IPPs contend their analysis covers nearly all of the market in the United
18 States, including companies responsible for approximately 80 percent of personal computer retail
19 sales, and 45 percent of top distributor sales.

20 Dr. Flamm also offers the results of his efforts to test the impact of price points through a
21 quantile regression analysis. That regression is designed to test the relationship between cost and
22 price changes for computer price points at 99 dollar increments (e.g., \$299, \$399, \$499, etc.). Dr.
23 Flamm opines that these studies show the pass-through rate was 100 percent or greater at all price
24 points.

25 One aspect of the IPPs’ arguments and Dr. Flamm’s analysis in the renewed motion has
26 provoked an especially vigorous challenge from defendants. To account for issues raised by initial
27 price setting for new products and/or for efforts by manufacturers and retailers to offer products at
28 particular price points, or within certain price ranges, the IPPs contend that in some instances

1 manufacturers will adjust the “quality” of particular computer systems, rather than the price. In
2 other words, the manufacturer can select the particular components and features to include or omit
3 so as to preserve the expected profit margins for a particular target retail price. Thus, as a simplified
4 example using the hypothetical above, if a manufacturer is paying a \$5 overcharge for an ODD, it
5 may choose to omit a camera feature that would have cost it \$%. Then, its cost is still \$899, and it
6 and the retailer can each still realize a \$50 profit on the \$999 sale to the IPP.

7 Defendants insist this theory of pass-through in the form of “lower quality” is fatally flawed
8 for at least two reasons. First, defendants contend it would require a consumer-by-consumer inquiry
9 as to the *value* each consumer places (or does not place) on any such omitted features. Defendants
10 make the inarguable point that while one consumer may care very much whether or not a computer
11 he or she buys has some particular feature, another may care not at all. Someone intending to use a
12 computer to place a Skype call needs a camera—someone intending only to word-process and surf
13 the internet may not.

14 Defendant’s focus on the subjective desires of individual consumers is misplaced, and is not
15 supported by legal precedent requiring any such approach. Objectively, if a person pays, for
16 example, \$999 for a computer system that has no \$5 camera when, in a but-for world, an otherwise
17 identical computer sold for \$999 would include a \$5 camera, then he or she has paid \$5 more than
18 the computer is actually worth. A person who has no desire or intention of driving a car at 120 miles
19 an hour is still damaged if he or she pays Ferrari prices for an economy commuter car. Although
20 losing a few dollars’ worth of features in a computer is less extreme, the principle is the same. The
21 harm lies in paying more than the product is objectively worth, and does not turn on the individual
22 user’s desire or lack of desire for a specific feature.⁸

23 Defendants’ second attack on the “lower quality” theory relies on language in *GPU* that “to
24 satisfy Section 4 of the Clayton Act, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they paid a higher price for

25
26 ⁸ Defendants contend the court in *GPU* denied class certification in part because individual inquiries
27 would be necessary regarding what particular consumers would have purchased if an antitrust
28 conspiracy had not allegedly limited choice and suppressed innovation in the market. In contrast,
the alleged reduction in “quality” here involves products being sold for more than they would be
objectively worth in the but-for world. The concern expressed by the *GPU* court is not implicated
by these circumstances.

1 their graphics card or computer than they otherwise would have paid in the absence of a
2 conspiracy.” *GPU*, 253 F.R.D. at 507. The *GPU* court, however, made that response to a suggestion
3 by the plaintiffs that even if they could not show they had suffered *any* economic injury, they should
4 still be entitled to recover nominal damages for having “lower quality, less choice, and reduced
5 innovation.” *Id.* Here, IPPs are not offering the “reduced quality” theory as an alternative to
6 economic injury, but as the means by which they intend to argue they overpaid in some instances for
7 computers containing ODDs.

8 Defendants’ further challenges to the adequacy of the IPPs’ showing on pass-through fall
9 into three basic categories. First, defendants argue that Dr. Flamm’s studies are flawed and
10 misleading because, in their view, he has not looked at sufficient relevant categories of data, and/or
11 because he has again improperly aggregated data in ways that conceal the existence, or potential
12 existence, of ODD sales in which there was no pass-through. As before, the IPPs have adequately
13 shown that any questions regarding the appropriate degree to which data should be aggregated to
14 derive reliable results fall on the “merits” side of the line and do not present grounds for denying
15 class certification at this point in time.

16 While it may be that Dr. Flamm and the IPPs have not “studied” pass-through in all of the
17 various marketing chains and manners through which ODDs are sold, this too falls into the category
18 of arguments defendants may present to a fact-finder as reasons to reject Dr. Flamm’s conclusions,
19 rather than a basis for denying certification. Furthermore, as noted, the IPPs’ basic theory is that
20 cost-savings are virtually *always* passed through in general circumstances like those present here.
21 The mere fact that the IPPs have not “tested” the validity of that theory in all the relevant factual
22 permutations does not give rise to a contrary inference that pass-through likely does *not* occur in the
23 particular instances the IPPs have not closely examined.

24 Next, defendants contend the IPPs have failed to account for “real world” evidence that cost-
25 savings on component parts are *not* always passed through. To the extent defendants rely on
26 testimony from industry participants denying that cost-savings are always passed through, they
27 have, in the language of summary judgment motion practice, merely created a triable issue of fact.
28 In the context of class certification, they have not shown that the existence of such testimony

1 compels a conclusion that the IPPs' basic economic theory is so lacking in possible validity that it
2 can be legally foreclosed at this juncture.⁹

3 Finally, defendants argue that the IPPs have not accounted for, and will never be able to
4 account for, instances in which retailers sold computer systems below cost, provided discounts or
5 rebates, or bundled products together. Defendants contend in such instances any overcharges were
6 necessarily not passed-through, or the amount of pass-through is inherently not ascertainable. The
7 IPPs' response is simple. If, for instance, a retailer obtained a computer at \$600, including a \$5
8 overcharge, and for whatever reason sold it "below cost" at \$500, then it is reasonable to assume in
9 the but-for world the retailer would have paid \$595 for the computer and sold it at \$495. The
10 overcharge is passed through to the IPP without regard to whether the retailer sells above or below
11 cost. A similar analysis can be applied where there is "bundling," discounts, or rebates. Defendants
12 have not shown why the IPPs should be legally precluded from proceeding on this theory.

13 None of this is to say, of course, that the IPPs ultimately will be able to prove pass-through
14 in fact took place across the board as they contend. The crucial point is that whether the IPPs theory
15 is right or wrong, it is something that can be decided on a class-wide basis.¹⁰ While defendants have
16 offered some compelling evidence apparently contradicting the IPPs' contention that cost savings
17 are virtually always passed through, that evidence, as well as defendant's attacks on the
18 completeness and accuracy of Dr. Flamm's pass-through studies, present issues to be decided on the
19 merits.

20

21 ⁹ Defendants also rely on evidence of other counter examples, including the fact that Dell charged
22 the same price for adding an ODD to customer-configured computer systems over an extended time
23 period during which Dell's costs for those ODDs presumably was falling. While the IPPs would
24 have that evidence disregarded on various grounds at this juncture, it seems likely that defendants
25 will be able to cure any technical deficiencies in their presentation by the time of trial. Nevertheless,
the mere possibility that defendants ultimately will be able to prove on the merits that cost savings
were not always passed through is not sufficient reason to deny certification now.

26 ¹⁰ Because plaintiffs acknowledge that even under their theory and studies pass-through rates were
27 not *entirely* uniform, there may be individualized issues of damages that will require further
attention. At least at this juncture, however, there is no indication the issue is one that would defeat
28 certification in the first instance. *See Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.
2014) ("[i]n this circuit . . . damage calculations alone cannot defeat class certification.") (citation
omitted).

1 C. Rule 23(a) certification requirements

2 The discussion above focused on class certification requirements arising under Rule 23(b),
3 as those have been the central focus of the controversy, both in the original motions by the DPPs and
4 the IPPs, and in this renewed motion by the IPPs alone. The prior order suggested that the IPPs
5 faced few challenges in showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) for certification of a class could
6 be satisfied. Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so numerous that joinder of all members is
7 impracticable. It remains the case that there is no dispute the “numerosity” requirement is met here.
8 To satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs need not state the “exact” number of potential class members,
9 nor is there a specific minimum number that is required. See *In re Rubber Chem. Antitrust Litig.*,
10 232 F.R.D. 346, 350–51 (N.D.Cal.2005); *In re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prod. Antitrust Litig.*, 2006
11 WL 891362, *5 (D.N.J.2006). Here, the number of indirect purchasers of computers containing
12 ODDs and standalone ODDs plainly is sufficient to support class treatment.

13 Defendants, however, now challenge the IPPs’ ability to establish “ascertainability,” a
14 requirement not expressly stated in the rule. See *In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.*, 289
15 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (members of the class must be sufficiently definable and
16 identifiable). Although the concern raised by defendants that class members will be subjected to a
17 “memory” test as to the source of their ODDs may present some issues, at this juncture it appears
18 that retailers’ records likely will suffice to identify a substantial and sufficient portion of the class.

19 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there exist “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Where
20 an antitrust conspiracy has been alleged, courts have frequently held that “the very nature of a
21 conspiracy antitrust action compels a finding that common questions of law and fact exist.” See *In*
22 *re Rubber Chem. Antitrust Litig.*, 232 F.R.D. at 351; *In re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prod. Antitrust*
23 *Litig.*, 2006 WL 891362 at *5. As in the prior order, at a minimum, the existence, scope, and
24 efficacy of the conspiracy to fix or stabilize prices of ODDs sold in the United States are all
25 common questions that IPPs must address. Also as before, the extent to which such common
26 questions *predominate*, and/or can be answered through *common proof*, has been addressed above,
27 in connection with Rule 23(b)(3).

28

1 Rule 23(a)(3) also requires that the claims of the named plaintiffs be typical of those of the
2 class. “Typical” does not mean “identical to.” Rather, typicality results if the representative
3 plaintiffs’ claims “arise[] from the same event, practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the
4 claims of the absent class members and if their claims are based on the same legal or remedial
5 theory.” *In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig.*, 193 F.R.D. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

6 In evaluating typicality, the court should consider whether the named plaintiffs’ “individual
7 circumstances are markedly different or . . . the legal theory upon which the claims are based differs
8 from that upon which the claims of other class members will perforce be based.” *See In re Bulk*
9 *[Extruded] Graphite Prod. Antitrust Litig.*, 2006 WL 891362 at *5. In cases involving an alleged
10 price-fixing conspiracy, the representative plaintiff’s claim is often considered typical even where
11 the plaintiff followed different purchasing procedures, purchased in different quantities or at
12 different prices, or purchased a different mix of products than did the members of the class. *See*,
13 *e.g.*, *In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.*, 191 F.R.D. 472, 479 (W.D.Pa.1999); *In re Indus. Diamonds*
14 *Antitrust Litig.*, 167 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y.1996).

15 Addressing a closely-related issue, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties
16 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. This “adequacy” requirement mandates that
17 no conflicts of interest exist between the named plaintiffs and the absent class members. *See, e.g.*, *In*
18 *re Rubber Chem. Antitrust Litig.*, 232 F.R.D. at 351, citing *Local Joint Exec. Bd. of*
19 *Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.*, 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001).¹¹

20 While the prior order raised questions as to the typicality and adequacy of the representative
21 plaintiffs in the DPP action, it expressly stated that there did not appear to be serious concerns as to
22 the named IPPs. Defendants now argue, however, that because some major IPPs were business
23 entities, the individuals named as representative plaintiffs may not adequately advance their
24 interests. While there are surface similarities between this issue and the concerns raised in the prior
25

26 ¹¹ The adequacy requirement also contains an element relating to the competence and diligence of
27 class counsel in pursuing the claims. *See id.*; *see also In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.*, 203 F.R.D.
197, 207 (E.D. Pa. 2001). There is no concern in this instance with the adequacy of class counsel.

1 order as to the DPP representatives, there is nothing that suggests it presents a serious barrier to
2 certification.

3 Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that a class action be superior to other methods of
4 adjudication. Some authority suggests that the superiority requirement is satisfied almost *a fortiori* if
5 common questions are found to predominate in an antitrust action. *See In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel)*
6 *Antitrust Litig.*, 267 F.R.D. 583, 608 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Again, while there were concerns on this
7 point with respect to the DPPs' motion given the identity and size of some of the largest direct
8 purchasers of ODDs, in the case of this renewed motion by the IPPs, there is nothing to suggest the
9 requirement of "superiority" presents any particular issues not subsumed elsewhere in the analysis.

10 Accordingly, because the IPPs have now made an adequate showing that they can satisfy the
11 requisites of Rule 23, their motion for class certification may and will be granted.¹² The remaining
12 issue is the scope of the class to be certified.

13

14 D. Scope of the Class—due process and choice of law

15

16 In order of preference, the IPPs seek certification of:

17

18 1. A nationwide class under California law,
19 2. A class of plaintiffs from 23 states plus the District of Columbia, under California law, or
20 3. 24 separate classes, under the laws of each of the relevant jurisdictions.

21

22 ¹² As tentatively suggested in the prior order, and confirmed now, there is no reason to conclude
23 defendants' intent to raise a defense pursuant to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
24 U.S.C. § 6a ("FTAIA") precludes certification or cannot be decided on a class-wide basis. *See In re*
25 *TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.*, 267 F.R.D. 583, 599 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("The Court
26 concludes that the FTAIA defense can be resolved on a class basis, and thus the possibility of this
27 defense does not provide a basis for denying certification. Courts have emphasized that the FTAIA
28 analysis focuses on the defendants' conduct."). While defendants contend there will be variations
among ODD sales as to the applicability of the FTAIA and its exceptions depending on the
circumstances of sales in the supply chain, such differences turn on defendants' actions and do not
appear to require individualized inquiries of the sort that present a barrier to class certification.

1 Either of the first two options would require applying California law to purchases made in
 2 other states. That is permissible only if the IPPs show that doing so comports with both (1) due
 3 process, and (2) California's choice of law rules. *See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co.*, 666 F.3d 581,
 4 589–90 (9th Cir. 2012).

5 In *AT&T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.*, 707 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) the Ninth
 6 Circuit held that California's "Cartwright Act can be lawfully applied without violating a
 7 defendant's due process rights when more than a *de minimis* amount of that defendant's alleged
 8 conspiratorial activity leading to the sale of price-fixed goods to plaintiffs took place in California."
 9 *Id.* at 1113. As the court further observed, "[s]uch a defendant cannot reasonably complain that the
 10 application of California law is arbitrary or unfair when its alleged conspiracy took place, at least in
 11 part, in California." *Id.*

12 Although *AT&T Mobility* was decided at the pleading stage, here the IPPs have presented
 13 sufficient evidence of each defendant's alleged conspiratorial conduct in California to satisfy their
 14 obligation to establish it was "more than a *de minimis* amount." Although the showing is admittedly
 15 thinner as to some defendants than others, it is relevant that none of the remaining defendants are
 16 based anywhere other than in California or overseas. As such, defendants have no reasonable basis
 17 to contend application of California law offends due process.

18 The choice of law analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the court determines whether the
 19 laws of the affected jurisdictions are "the same or different." *Mazza*, 666 F.3d at 589 (quoting
 20 *McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC*, 225 P.3d 516, 527 (Cal. 2010)). Second, if the laws are different,
 21 the court "examines each jurisdiction's interest in the application of its own law" to determine
 22 whether a "true conflict" exists. *Id.* Finally, if a true conflict exists, the court determines "which
 23 state's interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the law of the other state."
 24 *Id.*

25 Here, all parties agree the most significant difference in law among the various jurisdictions
 26 lies in whether or not a particular jurisdiction follows the rule of *Illinois Brick*¹³ or is instead an
 27

28 ¹³ *Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois*, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

1 “*Illinois Brick* repealer.” The IPPs concede this is a “true conflict.” IPPs would lack standing to
2 pursue this action in the non-repeater jurisdictions, absent application of California law.

3 The IPPs argue, however, that the conflict can be disregarded because non-repeater states
4 have no particular interest in precluding California from applying its laws to provide remedies to
5 anyone injured by antitrust and unfair competition emanating from the state. Given that the action
6 simply could not go forward in non-repeater states, however, it is too much of a stretch to employ
7 California law as an end run around the limitations those states have elected to impose on standing.
8 See *In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.*, 2013 WL 4175253, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013)
9 (rejecting application of California law to a non-repeater state, in light of that state’s interest in
10 limiting standing). Accordingly, a nationwide class will not be certified.

11 Defendants argue that California law should not even be applied to repealer states, asserting
12 that there still exist numerous differences between the California antitrust and unfair competition
13 laws and those in many of the other 24 jurisdictions. The parties were specifically given the
14 opportunity to submit additional briefing to flesh out their arguments on the conflicts that would
15 exist solely in the context of a 24-jurisdiction class. Apart from the *Illinois Brick* issue, however,
16 the potential differences identified between California and some of the other jurisdictions do not
17 appear to stand as true conflicts, or as ones that should not yield to California’s interests.¹⁴
18 Accordingly, the IPPs motion for class certification will be granted as to the 24 jurisdictions they
19 have identified, under California law.

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¹⁴ Defendants suggest that in at least some of the non-California jurisdictions, the principles of *Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters*, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) might be applied under local law to preclude IPP recovery. If so, that would present a conflict similar to that existing in non-*Illinois Brick* repealer jurisdictions. At least at this juncture, though, the record does not support a conclusion that the outcome in those jurisdictions would be materially different under local law than under California law.

1 V. CONCLUSION

2 The motion for class certification is granted, to the extent set out above. Within 30 days of
3 the date of this order, the parties shall submit jointly a report as to their respective positions on how
4 the litigation should proceed from this juncture.

5
6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

7
8 Dated: February 8, 2016


9 RICHARD SEEBORG
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE